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INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation long has attracted considerable
interest from investors, academics, regulators, and the media. It
received increased attention in the wake of the Enron and other
corporate governance scandals that erupted at the beginning of the
century. Hundreds of firms were found to have engaged in various
forms of earnings manipulation that, ultimately, destroyed tens of
billions of dollars of social value.1 Much of this earnings manipulation
was linked to executives' pay arrangements, such as their ability to
time the unwinding of their equity incentives.
2
The scandals eventually led to some of the most important
corporate governance reforms in decades, most notably the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act ("SOX"). 3 These reforms were intended to improve corporate
governance, including executive pay arrangements. In fact, SOX and
accompanying reforms appear to have had some positive effects on
compensation practices. For example, SOX's disclosure requirements
seem to have reduced substantially the amount of option grant
backdating.
4
However, these reforms did little to address one of the most
important defects plaguing executive compensation arrangements:
managers' ability to time the disposition of equity incentives.
Executives retain significant discretion over when they sell shares,
including stock received via exercise of their options. The freedom to
sell substantial amounts of stock over a short period gives rise to two
types of problems. First, executives can use inside information to
determine when to sell large amounts of shares. Second, whatever an
1. The collapse of Enron alone was estimated to have destroyed $30 billion of social value.
See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, FIN. MGMT., Spring 2005, at 5, 10-11
(concluding that Enron executives' efforts in making their business appear to be worth $70
billion ultimately destroyed a business actually worth about $30 billion).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
4. Jesse M. Fried, Option Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (describing studies showing a decrease in the amount of backdating following
enactment of SOX). Even after SOX, however, thousands of companies continued to backdate
option grants and exercises to inflate and camouflage executive pay. Id.
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executive's motive for selling, the sale of a large block of stock gives
the executive an incentive to inflate the short-term stock price to boost
his trading profits.
Executives' use of inside information and price manipulation to
boost their trading profits hurts public investors. Each extra dollar
pocketed by managers comes at the expense of public shareholders.
More importantly, executives' ability to sell on inside information and
inflate the short-term stock price before unwinding can reduce the size
of the total corporate pie by distorting managers' operational decisions
ex ante. The indirect costs to public investors of such distortions are
likely to be far larger than the value directly captured by executives.
This Article suggests that firms use what I call "hands-off'
options-options that are cashed out according to a fixed, gradual, and
pre-announced schedule. 5 By removing executives' control over the
timing of unwinding, such options would make it impossible for
executives to sell on inside information. And by making each sale
relatively small, hands-off options would sharply decrease executives'
incentive to manipulate the stock price around dispositions.
6
This Article explains that hands-off options would create such
benefits at little cost to executives or shareholders. They will neither
impose much burden on executives, nor lead to an undesirable
reduction in managerial shareholdings. Indeed, hands-off options
could be structured to increase the amount of equity held by
managers, further boosting managers' incentive to generate
shareholder value.
7
5. Although I use the term "hands-off options" throughout, the same arrangement could
(and should) be used for restricted stock.
6. This Article builds on earlier work of mine that analyzed the problem arising from
executives' ability to time the unwinding of their equity incentives and advocated requiring
executives to disclose their trades in advance. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of
Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 306 (1998)
[herinafter Fried, Pretrading Disclosure] (proposing and analyzing a rule that would require
insiders to make public their intended trade prior to trading); Jesse M. Fried, Advance Disclosure
of Managers' Stock Trades: A Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation, ECONOMISTS' VOICE,
Oct. 2006, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss8/art7/ (same). Such an approach, I showed, would
substantially reduce (but not eliminate) managers' ability to trade on inside information. The
hands-off approach, in contrast, would make it impossible for executives to make insider trading
profits while selling their shares. See infra Part II.B.1.
7. In addition to ensuring that executives retain a desirable amount of equity, hands-off
options might yield several other collateral benefits. For example, they would encourage
managers to focus on running the business rather than timing their trades. They would also
reduce arbitrary differences in executives' payoffs due to transaction timing luck, increasing pay
equity within the management team. In this Article, however, I focus only on hands-off options'
ability to both prevent information-driven selling and reduce managers' incentive to manipulate
the stock price prior to selling.
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Although hands-off options are likely to benefit the public
shareholders of most firms, boards and executives may well be
reluctant to adopt such an arrangement. Executives' ability to sell on
inside information and inflate the stock price around stock sales
provides them with hidden compensation-something that they are in
no hurry to give up. And because directors tend to favor executives
over shareholders on compensation-related matters, boards are
unlikely to insist on an arrangement strongly opposed by management
unless they are pressured to do so.8 Thus, institutional investors
should strongly urge firms to adopt hands-off options.
Regulators could assist by making a small change to
compensation disclosure rules. In particular, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") could require that firms giving
managers broad freedom to unwind their equity incentives explain
how this arrangement best serves shareholders. The difficulty of
justifying such discretion may make some boards more receptive to
shareholder pressure to adopt hands-off options.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I shows that managers
are able to sell on inside information and inflate the stock price before
unwinding their equity incentives. It also describes the costs of such
insider selling and price manipulation. Part II explains how hands-off
options would reduce these costs without burdening executives or
undermining their incentive to create shareholder value. It also
suggests how firms can be encouraged to adopt such options. A
conclusion follows.
I. INFORMED SELLING AND PRICE MANIPULATION
This Part explains that existing compensation arrangements
enable executives to sell on inside information and manipulate the
stock price around their sales, both of which impose costs on public
shareholders. Section A describes the evidence that managers use
inside information to time their stock sales and often inflate the short-
term stock price before selling to boost their trading profits. Section B
explains why existing legal arrangements have failed to prevent
executives from trading on inside information (including their
knowledge that the firm is manipulating the stock price). Section C
details the costs to shareholders when managers sell on inside
8. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 23-44 (2004)




information and inflate the stock price before disposing of their
shares.
A. The Evidence
Executives commonly receive a large fraction of their
compensation in the form of stock options and restricted stock. After
the equity vests, executives are generally free to choose when to cash
it out. They can sell large amounts of stock at once or over a short
period. As we will see, executives frequently use inside information to
time these sales, and they often manipulate information to boost the
stock price before selling.
1. Selling on Inside Information
Since academics began studying executives' trades over thirty
years ago, they have found an overwhelming amount of evidence that
executives use inside information to time their sales, selling before
bad news emerges and the stock price declines. 9 For example,
executives tend to exercise their options and sell the underlying stock
before earnings deteriorate and the price of the stock underperforms
the market. 1° These studies help explain the body of evidence
indicating that managers make considerable abnormal profits-that
is, higher than market returns-when trading in their own firms'
stock.1
The last decade has provided many dramatic examples of
insiders unloading shares before their firms' stock prices plunged. A
study published by Fortune in September 2002 examined executive
trading in the shares of publicly held firms that had reached a market
capitalization of at least $400 million and whose shares subsequently
had fallen at least seventy-five percent. 12 The firms were ranked by
the amount of executive sales.13 At the top twenty-five firms, 466
9. See Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 317-20, for a survey of the literature
through 1998.
10. See Jennifer N. Carpenter & Barbara Remmers, Executive Stock Option Exercises and
Inside Information, 74 J. Bus. 513, 531-32 (2001) (finding that top managers at small firms time
the exercise of their options based on inside information); Bin Ke, Steven Huddart & Kathy
Petroni, What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use It: Evidence from
Insider Trades, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 342-43 (2003) (finding that insiders time their trades
well in advance of negative news in order to avoid the appearance of trading on inside
information).
11. Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 322-23; H. NEJAT SEYHUN, INVESTMENT
INTELLIGENCE FROM INSIDER TRADING 63 (MIT Press 1998).




executives collectively sold $23 billion before their stocks
plummeted.'4
2. Price Manipulation Around Sales
Whether or not insiders' stock sales are motivated by inside
information, insiders have an incentive to manipulate information to
boost the stock price before selling. In fact, many studies have found a
connection between the level of insider selling and earnings
manipulation-both legal and illegal. For example, firms in which
annual option exercises are particularly high tend to have higher
discretionary accruals (and therefore higher reported earnings) in
those years and lower discretionary accruals and earnings in the
subsequent two years. 15 And firms that fraudulently misstate their
earnings have a higher level of selling activity-measured by number
of transactions, number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares
sold.1
6
Again, it is not difficult to find dramatic examples of the link
between price manipulation and insider selling from the last decade.
For example, Gary Winnick, the CEO of Global Crossing, sold more
than $700 million worth of shares in the year before the firm filed for
bankruptcy, while the company was allegedly inflating sales
revenues. 17 Qwest insiders sold more than $2 billion of stock while
14. Id.
15. See Eli Bartov & Partha Mohanram, Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, and
Executive Stock-Option Exercises, 79 ACCT. REV. 889 (2004). See also Steven Huddart & Henock
Louis, Stock Returns, Earnings Management, and Insider Selling During the 1990s Stock
Market Bubble 32 (June 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law
Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=912214 (reporting that
managers tend to inflate earnings more before high levels of insider selling).
16. Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements
and Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 ACCT. REV. 131, 144 (1998). See also Messod D.
Beneish, Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements that Violate GAAP, 74
ACCT. REV. 425, 454 (1999)( finding that managers of firms whose earnings were overstated
tended to sell at a high rate before the overstatements were corrected); Natasha Burns & Simi
Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 63
(2006) (finding that top managers of firms that experienced accounting irregularities and were
subsequently subject to SEC enforcement actions had exercised their options in the preceding
period at a higher rate than top managers of other firms); Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan &
Yisong S. Tian, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of the Incentives
Matter 25 (Nov. 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=395960 (finding that executives
at firms that commit fraud exercise significantly larger fractions of their vested options than
other executives).
17. Henny Sender & Rebecca Blumenstein, Questioning the Books: Global Crossing
Creditors Review Sales, Swaps, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2002, at A6.
458 [Vol. 61:2:453
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they were overstating revenues.' 8 Shortly thereafter, Qwest stock fell
more than ninety-five percent.19 Qwest's CEO, Joseph Nacchio, was
eventually charged with violating the insider trading laws.
20
Partly in response to the widespread practice of earnings
manipulation, Congress adopted SOX.21 One of the principal aims of
SOX was to increase the accuracy of financial reporting. Among other
things, SOX created a new government oversight board for the
accounting industry and attempted to improve internal controls.
22
While SOX may have reduced somewhat insiders' ability to
misreport earnings, it certainly has not eliminated that ability. In
2006, four years into the post-SOX era, the number of earnings
restatements filed by public companies reached an all-time record:
1876.23 Thus, SOX does not appear to have prevented managers from
misreporting.
24
Moreover, SOX fails to reach one of the most harmful forms of
earnings manipulation: "real earnings management," the practice of
making business decisions for the purpose of boosting short-term
accounting results rather than maximizing the size of the corporate
pie. For example, executives can prop up short-term earnings by
postponing desirable investments, or by accelerating revenue-
generating transactions that would create more long-term value if
they were delayed.
Because real earnings management does not violate the
accounting rules as long as all transactions are reflected properly in a
18. William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for
Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 103 (2002).
19. Id.
20. Dionne Searcey et al., Qwest's Nacchio Is Found Guilty in Trading Case; Ex-CEO's
Conviction on 19 of 42 Counts Adds to Government's Wins, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007, at Al.
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
22. Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 113-17
(2005).
23. David Reilly, Restatements Still Bedevil Firms-Overall Total Hits a Record as Big
Companies Improve; Backdating's Messy Wake, WALL. ST. J., Feb 12, 2007 at C7.
24. Section 304 of SOX requires the CEO and CFO of a firm forced to restate earnings to
return to the firm any bonus or other incentive- or equity-based compensation received within
twelve months of the misleading financial statement, or any profits realized from the sale of
stock during that period. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. II 2002).
Thus, some may have hoped that SOX would reduce not only executives' ability to manipulate
earnings, but also their incentive to do so. However, this "clawback" provision applies only in
special circumstances involving "misconduct," and it has been invoked mainly in cases where
executives were criminally convicted of fraud. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive
Executive Compensation-Why Bother? 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 299 (2007). Thus, Section 304 is
unlikely to deter misreporting in run-of-the-mill cases not involving criminal fraud.
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firm's financial statements, SOX cannot prevent or deter it. Indeed,
such manipulation appears to have increased after SOX.25 Thus, we
can expect executives who sell large blocks of stock to continue
manipulating the stock price around these sales-through both
misreporting and real earnings management-to increase their
trading profits.
B. The Limitations of Existing Restrictions on Insider Trading
Executives are able to sell shares in their firms while aware of
inside information (including, in some cases, the knowledge that they
are inflating the short-term stock price) because of inherent
limitations in the federal securities laws governing insider trading, as
well as the porosity of the voluntary insider trading restrictions
adopted by firms. This Section describes the limitations of the three
main constraints on insider trading: (1) the prohibition on insider
trading (Rule 10b-5); (2) SOX's stock-trading disclosure requirements;
and (3) firms' and executives' voluntary restrictions on insider trading.
1. Insider Trading Laws
The primary mechanism for regulating insider trading is the
duty to "disclose or abstain," which arises under Rule 10b-5 of the
1934 Act.26 Under this duty, a person possessing material nonpublic
information must disclose the information to, or abstain from trading
with, certain counterparties. 27 In particular, this duty arises when the
counterparty is entitled to know the information because of a fiduciary
duty or a similar relationship of trust and confidence between them.
28
The rule applies to executives selling their corporation's shares
because they are considered to owe a fiduciary duty to the firm's
public shareholders.
29
25. Daniel A. Cohen, Aisyesha Dey & Thomas Z. Lys, Real and Accrual-Based Earnings
Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods, ACCT. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 29), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=813088.
26. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). Executives' trading is also subject
to Section 16(b), the short-swing profit rule, but this rule cannot substantially reduce executives'
ability to trade on inside information. Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 343.
27. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230-31, 233 (describing the circumstances under which Rule
10b-5 creates a duty to disclose or abstain from trading when in possession of nonpublic
information).
28. Id. at 230-31.
29. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 72 (1989) (noting the 'long
legal history of imposing fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care on those who control the day-to-
day activities of the corporation").
[Vol. 61:2:453460
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However, there are two limitations to Rule 10b-5's ability to
prevent executives from trading on inside information. The first
relates to the legal definition of "materiality." Rule 10b-5 prohibits
trading on inside information only if the information is "material."30 In
SEC v. Texas Gul/Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit held that material
facts are those to which a "reasonable man would attach
importance ... in determining [whether to buy or sell shares]." 31 In
interpreting the term "material" under a related statute, the Supreme
Court provided a similar definition.
32
Because a reasonable investor presumably would consider
important any information that could be used to increase his trading
profits, this language might suggest that any information that
insiders could use to increase their trading profits would be legally
material. However, the Supreme Court also held that information does
not become legally material merely because an insider can earn profits
trading on it. 33 In practice, lower courts have been reluctant to find
information material unless it concerns a "bombshell event"34-such
as the definite existence of a takeover offer-whose announcement
causes the stock price to move sharply.35 Thus, the high threshold of
materiality used by the courts enables insiders to profit legally by
trading on many types of valuable private information.
36
The second limitation on Rule 10b-5's ability to prevent
executives from trading on inside information is that the rule is
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2006).
31. 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir. 1965)).
32. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that under Rule
14a-9, the general antifraud provisions of the SEC's proxy rules, "an omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote").
33. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (citing Pavlidis v. New England
Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (1st Cir. 1984)).
34. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857, 886-87 (1983) (arguing that Rule 10b-5 applies only in cases involving 'bombshell
events" and thus has a "minimal impact on insiders' behavior").
35. Consider the case of SEC v. Hoover. 903 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D. Tex. 1995). An insider of a
company that had publicly projected a decline in earnings of 10% sold the stock after learning
that the estimate of the decline in earnings had been revised downward to 10-12%. Id. at 1138.
Shortly thereafter, the company announced that it expected an earnings decline of 12-15%,
causing the price to fall 20%. Id. Although (as this case shows) even a small adjustment in
earnings estimates can cause a price change of large magnitude, the court granted summary
judgment for the insider on the ground that the SEC could not prove that the information on
which the insider traded was material. Id. at 1148.
36. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 34 (citing as an example of valuable but not legally
material information preliminary technological reports indicating costs will be higher than
expected).
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difficult to enforce. Although the penalty for violating Rule 10b-5 can
be quite severe, there are many situations where the probability of
apprehension and punishment is very low. 37 Corporate insiders engage
in hundreds of thousands of trades each year, any of which could be
motivated by material inside information in violation of Rule 10b-5.
However, the SEC has limited resources, most of which are not
allocated to policing insider trading.38 Thus, the SEC can investigate
only a tiny percentage of insider stock sales. 39 The evidence that
corporate insiders are not always deterred from trading on material
inside information is that sometimes executives are caught having
done so.
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Reporting Requirements
Before SOX, Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act required executives
to report most of their trades by the tenth day of the following month,
enabling them to wait as many as forty days before reporting these
trades. 40 SOX amended Section 16(a) to require executives to report a
trade to the SEC by the end of the second business day following the
transaction. 41
This two-day disclosure requirement will alert the market to
the possibility that managers are selling while aware of bad news (for
example, that short-term earnings are being inflated). If the trades
are suspiciously large or otherwise unusual, investors may intensify
their scrutiny of the firm, in some cases causing the stock price to
drop. This stock price adjustment, in turn, will reduce managers'
profits from any sales after the price drop.
However, SOX's disclosure rules enable managers to profit
from selling on inside information for two reasons. First, an executive
still can sell secretly for two days before revealing her trades. Any
adjustment in the stock price that occurs after the disclosure of these
trades will not diminish the insider trading profits reaped by the
37. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO
J. 933, 937 (1985) (noting that the "ability to detect [insider trading] will always be difficult, and
when the gains that can be realized from the practice, discounted by the risk of being
apprehended, are compared to the potential costs, many people will have the incentive to trade
on inside information").
38. Greg Steinmetz & Cacilie Rohwedder, SAP Insider Probe Points to Reforms Needed in
Germany, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1997, at A18 (citing the SEC as stating that only 10% of its
activities involve insider trading investigations).
39. Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 332.
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000). Certain trades did
not have to be reported until 45 days after the end of the year.
41. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 403(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 2002).
462 [Vol. 61:2:453
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executive before the announcement. Second, markets cannot process
immediately and accurately the information contained in insiders'
trading announcements. 42 Indeed, stocks traded by insiders show
abnormal returns for months after the announcement of the trade.
43
Thus, any price adjustment that takes place after an insider's first
announced sale is unlikely to wipe out her insider trading profits from
subsequent transactions. Not surprisingly, executives have continued
to make profits selling on inside information after the enactment of
SOX.
4 4
3. Voluntary Restrictions on Insider Trading
Firms and executives voluntarily have adopted two types of
restrictions on unwinding that somewhat reduce managers' ability to
trade on inside information: (1) trading windows and (2) so-called
"10b5-1" plans. However, these arrangements are quite porous,
leaving executives with substantial ability to use inside information to
time their trades and inflate the stock price before selling. Indeed, as I
will explain, the use of 10b5-1 plans may have exacerbated the
problem of insider trading.
a. Trading Windows
In the 1980s, Congress adopted various laws that held a firm
liable if an employee engaged in illegal insider trading and the firm
had not taken reasonable steps to prevent such trading.45 To reduce
the risk of liability, many firms adopted "trading windows" to restrict
the times when a manager can sell or buy shares.46 One common
approach, for example, is to permit managers to trade only during the
42. See Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 360 (noting that prices do not fully
adjust to reflect the information contained in trading reports after they are made public).
43. See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16
J, FIN. ECON. 189, 198 tbl.2 (1986) (showing abnormal stock price over a 300-day period following
insider trades).
44. See Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade 2 (Sept. 17,
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssrn.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=541502 (showing that insider trades after
SOX continue to be followed by abnormal stock price movements).
45. See generally Alan M. Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Violations: A Survey of
Corporate Compliance Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180, 182-83 (1990) (discussing the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988).
46. J.C. Bettis, J.L. Coles & M.L. Lemmon, Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by
Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2000).
2008]
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two- or three-week period after quarterly earnings have been
released.
47
Trading windows reduce executives' insider trading profits by
hampering their ability to time their trades to exploit anticipated
stock price changes. 48 In particular, insiders cannot trade profitably on
information that (a) they learn after a window period closes and (b)
emerges and becomes incorporated into the stock price before the start
of the next window period.
49
However, trading windows cannot prevent executives from
profiting from inside information they possess while a trading window
is open. In fact, insiders often trade heavily up to six months ahead of
major announcements, which suggests that they may well be aware of
important information during any given trading window. 50 Not
surprisingly, there is evidence that executives buy and sell on inside
information when trading windows are open.51
Trading windows also fail to prevent insiders from inflating the
stock price immediately before unloading large numbers of shares or
reduce their incentive to engage in such conduct. If executives expect
to sell considerable amounts of stock during an upcoming trading
window, they have a strong incentive to manipulate earnings or
engage in real earnings management before that window opens. Thus,
trading windows do little to address either the use of inside
information to time sales or the practice of manipulating the stock
price before selling.
b. 10b5-1 Plans
In 2000, the SEC created a new "safe harbor" from Rule 10b-5
liability for insiders selling or buying company shares under certain
conditions. Under this safe harbor, found in Rule 10b5-1, an executive
is permitted to trade while in possession of material nonpublic
information if the transaction is effected according to a plan created at
47. See, e.g., Bridget O'Brian, Insider Selling of a Stock Headed South May Mean Others
Should Also Bail Out, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1996, at C14 (describing how Micro Warehouse, Inc.
only allows executives to trade five days after earnings are released); Joseph B. White &
Alexandra Peers, GM Executives Sold Stock Prior to Sharp Drop in Price, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
1991, at C1 (explaining that GM executives can trade only during four annual ten day window
periods after the release of corporate earnings).
48. Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 346.
49. Id.




a time when the executive was not in possession of material nonpublic
information. 52 Many executives have used such plans to sell shares.
53
In principle, a Rule 10b5-1 compliant plan should prevent an
insider from using material inside information to time her sales.
However, deterring an insider from using material inside information
to set up a Rule 10b5-1 plan is very difficult. Executives often have
inside information bearing on the price of the firm's stock months
before it emerges. It would be hard to prove that a particular insider
had material inside information when she entered into a plan months
before the information became public. Such an insider knows she is
unlikely to be caught and convicted and is therefore likely to be
undeterred from using material inside information to enter a Rule
10b5-1 plan.
Moreover, as I explained earlier, the "materiality" threshold is
quite high. Insiders thus can enter legally into these plans based on
sub-material, but still important, information. Even if regulators are
able to prove that the executive created the plan with such
information, the executive cannot be sanctioned. The combination of
these limitations-the difficulty of detection and the high threshold of
materiality-will make it hard to prevent insiders from using 10b5-1
plans to trade on valuable inside information.
And like trading windows, Rule 10b5-1 plans do not prevent
executives from manipulating the stock price around their sales or
reduce their incentive to do so. Executives who have scheduled large
sales under these plans have every reason to boost the short-term
stock price, through manipulating earnings or otherwise, to get a
higher price for their stock.
Consider the case of Midway Games CEO David Zucker.
Zucker set up a 10b5-1 plan in December 2006 as the firm's board, in
response to various problems at the company, approved a plan to take
a significant charge to earnings and lay off workers. 54 Pursuant to the
plan, Zucker sold 50,000 shares every trading day between December
19, 2006, and January 6, 2007, unloading a total of 650,000 shares for
$12.9 million.55 Between mid December and late February, the stock
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2006); Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455,
487 (2003).
53. See Dionne Searcey & Kara Scannell, SEC Now Takes a Hard Look at Insiders'
"Regular' Sales, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2007, at C1 (reporting that executives voluntarily reported
selling $8.5 billion worth of stock through such plans in 2006).
54. Jane Sasseen, A Closer Look at Trades by Top Brass; Some Execs May Be Abusing an




lost almost sixty percent of its value. 56 Zucker was not the only
Midway executive who decided to sell shares in December 2006. Three
other managers set up 10b5-1 plans and sold stock at the same time,
two of whom also created their plans shortly before the restructuring
announcement. 57 It is not clear whether the information Zucker and
the executives traded on was material. It is clear, however, that they
profited from using 10b5-1 plans to sell on inside information.
Zucker's story is not an anomaly. In a study of executive
trading in over 1200 firms during a five-year period ending in January
2006 (which includes several years after Sarbanes-Oxley had been in
effect), Alan Jagolinzer found that insiders regularly use 10b5-1 plans
to sell on inside information. 58 In fact, he found that executives using
10b5-1 plans were more likely to sell on valuable inside information
than executives not using such plans. 59 Jagolinzer's study suggests
that 10b5-1 does not prevent insiders from trading on inside
information. Indeed, it suggests the opposite: insiders seeking to sell
on inside information set up 10b5-1 plans to do so, perhaps to
camouflage their informed trading from shareholders or to reduce the
risk of legal liability. Thus, Rule 10b5-1 actually may increase
executives' propensity to sell on inside information.
C. Costs to Shareholders
We have just seen that inherent limitations in both the federal
securities laws governing insider trading and the voluntary insider
trading restrictions adopted by firms enable managers to sell on inside
information and boost the stock price before selling their shares. This
Section describes the resulting costs to public shareholders.
1. Diversion of Value
To begin, the profits made by executives using inside
information to time their sales or inflating the stock price before
selling their shares directly reduce public shareholders' returns. Each
dollar reaped by insiders comes at investors' expense. In another
article, I calculated that such trading puts at least several billion
dollars into the pockets of executives each year. 60
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Jagolinzer, supra note 44, at 13, 19.
59. Id. at 13 and accompanying tables.
60. Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 323.
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One might argue that these profits are just another form of
compensation. In principle, boards could reduce other components of
executives' compensation arrangements for every dollar of insider
trading profits made. Indeed, some commentators have made this very
claim.
61
But insider trading profits and gains from manipulating the
short-term stock price are peculiar types of pay. They are tied to
executives' informational advantage and their ability to control the
flow of information to the market, not to their contribution to long-
term shareholder value. Permitting managers to make such gains is
an inefficient way to reward them for performance. Indeed, as I
explain below, these profits provide executives with incentives to take
steps that may reduce shareholder value.
In any event, shareholders-the owners of the corporation-
have little way of knowing the extent of managers' insider trading and
price manipulation profits. These profits do not show up in any of the
firm's publicly disclosed accounting information or in compensation
figures. As a result, they generally are well camouflaged from
investors except in notorious cases-those where large sales of stock
immediately precede dramatic declines in the stock price. Even the
board may have little sense of the magnitude of these profits. Thus, it
is unlikely that insider trading and price-manipulation profits are
offset by reductions in other elements of executives' compensation.
2. Weakening and Distortion of Incentives
In addition to diverting value directly from public investors,
insiders' ability to sell on bad news and manipulate the stock price
before selling also undermines, and in some cases perverts, the
desirable incentive effects of compensation arrangements. Huge
executive compensation packages are justified as necessary to
motivate managers to generate shareholder value. 62 Permitting
executives to sell on bad news (or at an inflated price) reduces the
financial payoff differential between good and poor performance,
thereby weakening managers' incentive to increase shareholder
value. 63
61. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 34, at 881 n.80 (arguing that shareholders end
up paying managers the same compensation whether or not insider trading profits are part of
the compensation package).
62. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the
Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 664 (2005) (discussing the view that executives should be paid more to
increase their incentive to generate shareholder value).
63. See id. at 665.
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Furthermore, manipulating information to boost the stock price
can create perverse incentives. Executives who are free to unload
large amounts of shares may seek to raise short-term stock prices by
running the firm in a way that improves short-term results at the
expense of long-term value. 64 They also may have incentives to choose
less transparent projects, or to reduce the transparency of existing
projects, because the lack of transparency enables them to profit more
from their freedom to unload their holdings. 65
The costs to long-term shareholders of such distortions can be
considerable. The manipulation of earnings by Enron executives
destroyed a business with an estimated $30 billion of social value. 66
And this was just a single company.
Even the out-of-pocket costs of price manipulation are far from
trivial. For example, firms that restated their financial statements
following SEC allegations of accounting fraud from 1996 through 2002
collectively paid an extra $320 million in taxes as a result of
overstating their earnings by $3.36 billion,67 which enabled managers
to sell their shares at a higher price. And Fannie Mae incurred over $1
billion in expenses cleaning up its books after giving its executives a
compensation arrangement that encouraged them to manipulate
earnings.
68
II. THE HANDS-OFF APPROACH
As we have seen, executives' freedom to unwind their equity
incentives can impose substantial costs on shareholders. To reduce
these costs, this Part suggests that firms use what I call "hands-off'
options. Section A describes the hands-off approach. Section B
explains how hands-off options would eliminate managers' ability to
64. See Fried, Pretrading Disclosure, supra note 6, at 362 (explaining how executives'
ability to profit from short-term stock price fluctuations can reduce long-term value).
65. See Oren Bar-Gill & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Costs of Permitting Managers to Sell
Shares 2 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/corporate-governance/papers/03.Bar-
Gill.Bebchuk.cost-permitting.pdf (presenting a formal model showing why managers who are
free to unload their stock have an incentive to make information unobservable to the market).
66. Jensen, supra note 1.
67. Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon & Edward L. Maydew, How Much Will Firms Pay for
Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79 ACOT.
REV. 387, 406 (2004).
68. Fannie Mae's Profit Slashed: Restatement Erases $6.3 Billion After Accounting Scandal,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 2006, at 3; see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation
at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J.
CORP. L. 807, 809-12 (2005) (explaining how the structure of Fannie Mae's compensation
arrangements gave executives an incentive to inflate earnings).
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sell on inside information and substantially reduce their incentive to
manipulate the short-term stock price before selling. Section C shows
that the possible costs of hands-off options would be low. Section D
suggests how firms could be encouraged to adopt such options.
A. Description
Currently, executives have considerable freedom to determine
when to unwind their vested options and stock. A hands-off plan
would eliminate such discretion by automatically cashing out these
incentives according to a schedule announced at the time the options
or restricted shares are granted.
Consider the following example. Suppose that CEO of ABC
Corporation receives one million options that will all vest on January
1, 2010. On granting the options, ABC announces that it will cash out
five percent of CEO's options on the first trading day of January 2010
and each of the following nineteen months, until all the options are
liquidated.69 On each of these cash-out dates, CEO would receive the
difference between the options' exercise price and the closing stock
price. If the options are underwater-that is, if the exercise price is
below the cash-out date stock price-they would expire as worthless.
The cashing-out schedule could be made more complex. ABC
could impose a longer holding period after vesting. For example, ABC
could require CEO to hold all the options for several years after
vesting before they gradually are cashed out. ABC also could use a
non-linear schedule, rather than one that, as in the above example,
cashes out the same number of options each period. The important
elements of the hands-off approach are (1) the executive does not
control the timing of unwinding; and (2) each sale cashes out a
relatively small fraction of the original option grant.
B. Effect on Insider Selling and Price Manipulation
A hands-off plan would eliminate executives' ability to sell on
inside information and radically reduce their incentive to inflate the
stock price before selling.
69. As I explain in more detail below, the benefits of hands-off options could be enhanced by




Hands-off options leave executives no discretion as to when
their equity is cashed out. As a result, executives compensated with
such options could not use inside information to decide when to sell.
Hands-off options thus would eliminate all the insider trading profits
that executives make in connection with stock sales. No other
arrangement would be more effective at reducing executives' insider
trading profits.
2. Price Manipulation Around Sales
We saw that executives can control not only the timing of stock
sales, but also the flow of information around these sales, including
earnings information. 70 Thus, even managers who are unable to
determine when they unwind can make extra profits at the expense of
public shareholders. In particular, before unloading their shares,
executives can use both earnings manipulation and real earnings
management to boost the short-term stock price, potentially reducing
long-term shareholder value.71
Managers compensated with hands-off options still could
manipulate information around stock sales. However, they would have
much less incentive to do so. Each sale would involve only a relatively
small number of shares, reducing the benefit from inflating the stock
price around any given disposition date. Moreover, to the extent that
the cash-out schedule extends into the future and the price-boosting
manipulation would reduce long-term shareholder value, the cost of
such a strategy would be higher. In particular, manipulating the
short-term stock price to increase today's payout will reduce expected
payouts on future dates.
The incentive to manipulate information around cash-out dates
could be reduced further by scheduling cash outs to occur on days
when the executive receives fresh option grants. Most options are
granted at the money, with the exercise price set to the market price.
If cash-out dates coincide with grant dates for new at-the-money
options, an executive inflating the stock price to increase profits from
unwinding her old options will boost the exercise price of the new
options being granted the same day, reducing their value. Thus, the
net benefit of inflating the stock price would be even smaller.
7 2
70. See supra Part I.A.2.
71. See supra Part I.C.2.
72. Executives will often manipulate information around option grant dates to lower the




This Section considers two potential costs of hands-off options:
that they may (1) impose an excessive burden on executives and (2)
undesirably reduce executive equity holdings. It explains why neither
of these costs is likely to be significant. Indeed, hands-off options could
be used to ensure that executives always hold a sufficient amount of
equity, providing an additional benefit.
1. Burden on Executives
Hands-off options force executives to hold equity in their firms
for a specified duration. The hands-off approach may thus be seen as
imposing undesirable liquidity and diversification costs on managers.
But neither liquidity nor diversification considerations suggest that
executives need as much control over the timing of their equity
transactions as they currently enjoy.
a. Liquidity Costs
Hands-off options will reduce executives' ability to raise cash as
quickly as they can now, potentially imposing liquidity costs on
managers. However, executives with multi-million dollar pay
packages should be able to satisfy their legitimate liquidity needs
through a combination of scheduled equity cash outs and their salary,
bonus, and long-term incentive plan payouts. Unusually large
liquidity needs could be met by designing a shorter cash-out schedule.
Satisfying the liquidity needs of executives does not require giving
them unfettered discretion over the unwinding of their equity
incentives.
b. Diversification Costs
Executives are likely to hold large amounts of their own firm's
stock, exposing them to considerable firm-specific risk. To reduce the
riskiness of their portfolio, executives may prefer to sell some of this
stock and invest the money elsewhere. By forcing executives to hold
equity in their firms for a specified period, hands-off options may
Scheduling cash-out dates to coincide with option grant dates can thus provide another benefit.
To the extent an executive takes steps to lower the stock price so as to boost the value of new
option grants, she reduces the profits from the cashing out of her old options. Thus, scheduling
cash-out dates to coincide with option grant dates would reduce not only executives' incentives to




impose additional risk-bearing costs on executives. Indeed, excessive
equity holdings could make executives too cautious in their
decisionmaking, harming shareholders.
But such diversification concerns, like executives' liquidity
needs, could be reflected in the design of the hands-off arrangement. If
in a particular case the risk-bearing costs were considered
exceptionally large, the unwinding of the manager's equity could occur
more quickly. There is no reason to assume that risk-bearing
considerations necessitate giving executives full control over the
timing of their equity sales.
2. Reduction in Executive Equity Ownership?
As discussed above, requiring executives to retain equity in the
firm can impose liquidity and diversification costs on the executives.
However, having managers hold more equity can also yield benefits by
increasing managers' incentive to generate shareholder value. The
value-maximizing amount of managerial equity retention, which for
expositional convenience I will call "X," depends on the tradeoff
between these costs and benefits. By definition, moving executive
equity holdings closer to X increases value.
To the extent that hands-off options increase managers' equity
holdings, they may thus provide a third benefit (in addition to (1)
eliminating managers' ability to engage in insider trading and (2)
reducing their incentive to manipulate the stock price before selling).
In particular, when executives otherwise would hold less than X
equity, hands-off options may bring managers' equity ownership closer
to X.
However, there could be other scenarios in which a hands-off
arrangement undesirably moves the executive's level of equity
ownership further away from X. For example, an executive holding
less than X equity may believe that the stock is underpriced on a
particular cash-out date. If she could choose whether to unwind her
equity on that date, she might elect to hold rather than sell it. Under a
hands-off plan, however, some of her equity would be cashed out
automatically, leaving her with less equity than she otherwise would
hold. In such a case, hands-off options may undermine the executive's
subsequent incentive to generate shareholder value.
But hands-off options are unlikely to undesirably reduce
executive equity holdings. If the board identifies the desired level of
executive equity ownership ex ante, it can design the hands-off option
plan to ensure that the executive always retains that amount of
equity. And should changing circumstances make the optimal level of
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equity ownership higher than had been expected, the board can
arrange for the executive to acquire additional equity (by, for example,
reducing her cash compensation and issuing her more hands-off
options).
Moreover, even if in some scenarios a hands-off plan moves an
executive's equity holdings further away from X, the expected cost
associated with these scenarios must be weighed against the expected
benefit associated with the scenarios in which the plan brings the
executive's equity ownership closer to X (along with the benefits, in
all scenarios, of preventing the executive from selling on inside
information and of substantially reducing the incentive to engage in
price manipulation around her stock sales). There is no reason to
think that giving executives full discretion over the unwinding of their
vested equity incentives is likely, on average, to lead to more desirable
levels of equity holdings.
D. Going Forward
The benefits of hands-off options are likely to substantially
exceed the costs in many (if not all) firms. Interestingly, at least one
firm has adopted a compensation plan that embodies much of the
hands-off approach. In 2007, Level 3 Communications filed a
compensation plan with the SEC under which executives' options are
cash-settled according to a pre-disclosed gradual schedule. 73 To reduce
further managers' incentives to manipulate the stock price around
settlement dates, the cash-out dates coincide with grant dates for new
options.
Unfortunately, most boards are reluctant to adopt
shareholder-serving pay arrangements that are inconvenient for, and
thus opposed by, executives. 74 Thus, we cannot expect most boards to
follow Level 3's lead and adopt hands-off options-unless they are
pressured by shareholders to do so.
To that end, institutional investors should strongly encourage
firms to adopt some version of hands-off options. Institutional
investors routinely share their views about executive compensation
arrangements with boards and management, and there is evidence
that such pressure affects the amount and performance sensitivity of
73. Level 3 Communications, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form Def 14A), at 19 (filed Apr.
18, 2007), available at http:/lvlt.client.shareholder.com/sec.cfm?DocType=Proxy (at "DEF 14A"
heading, select "Definitive Proxy Statement).
74. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 659 (arguing that directors often do not conduct
compensation arrangements at arm's-length because they are ineffectual, influenced by
management, or inadequately motivated to insist on shareholder-serving compensation).
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managerial pay. 75 Shareholders seeking to tie managerial pay more
closely to performance-and thereby improve executives' incentives-
thus may find it worthwhile to put hands-off options on the agenda.
The SEC could assist by requiring firms to describe, in the
compensation disclosure and analysis section of their annual proxy
statements, the arrangements governing the unwinding of executives'
equity incentives. In particular, firms not using hands-off options
could be asked to explain why shareholders are served best by giving
executives discretion over the timing of their stock sales. The difficulty
of explaining why managers should have such freedom in unwinding
their equity incentives may make some firms more susceptible to
shareholder pressure to adopt hands-off options. Even if a firm fails to
adopt such options, this disclosure requirement would help
concentrate directors' attention on a major problem with executive
compensation.
CONCLUSION
Despite recent reforms, public company executives still use
inside information to time their stock sales, and they often inflate the
stock price before selling. Such manipulations, which secretly boost
executive pay, can impose large costs on shareholders. This Article has
suggested that executives' equity incentives be cashed out according to
a pre-specified, gradual schedule. It has shown that such a mechanism
would reduce substantially the costs associated with current equity
arrangements while imposing little burden on executives.
Because this hands-off approach would reduce executives'
ability to boost their pay under shareholders' radar screens, managers
are likely to resist its adoption. Boards, in turn, may be reluctant to
insist on a hands-off arrangement in the face of managers' objections.
Thus, institutional investors-who in the past have had some success
in improving executive pay arrangements-should strongly encourage
firms to adopt the hands-off approach. The SEC could lend a hand by
requiring non-adopting firms to explain why they believe it is in
shareholders' interest to allow executives to control the timing of their
stock sales and sell large amounts of stock over short periods. At the
very least, such a disclosure requirement would focus boards'
attention on a significant flaw in current equity-based pay
arrangements.
75. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation, 58
J. FIN. 2351, 2352-53 (2003).
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